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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
RIGHT OF MANDAMUSED OFFICIAL TO RAISE ISSUE
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
I
Three recent cases have brought into prominence again the
problem of recognizing the right of a public officer to raise the
defense of unconstitutionality of a statute in a mandamus pro-
ceeding to compel him to act under that statute.' The doubtful
judicial attitude towards this question will probably be more
finely crystallized within the next few years primarily because
of the mass of new legislative enactments, both state and national,
imposing numerous duties upon established or newly-created ad-
ministrative officials and agencies. "New Deal" recovery and
economy laws enacted by the forty-nine jurisdictions within the
United States must be carried out to a considerable extent by
executive agencies, as the law-making bodies recognize. May
the constitutionality of these new functions be questioned by
those upon whom they are imposed, is the question which is likely
to arise. Procedurally, the question is most likely to be pre-
sented in mandamus actions to compel officials to act. For ex-
ample, if a normal Republican state which was carried along by
the Democratic landslide in 1933 returns a Republican majority
in subsequent elections, will these newly elected officers be per-
mitted to question the validity of state or national enactments
opposed to their party policies?
As a general rule, a public officer whose duties are of a minis-
terial nature cannot raise the defense of unconstitutionality of
the statute imposing them.2 A number of reasons have been ad-
vanced by the courts to justify the rule. The most important of
these is the commonly acknowledged principle that the validity of
1 City of Mvntpelier v. Gates et al. (Vt. 1934) 170 Atl. 473; State e" rel.
Equality Building Association v. Brown (S. C. Mo. 1934) 68 S. W. (2d) 55;
State ex el. Webster Groves Loan and Building Association v. Brown (S. C.
Mo. 1934) 68 S. W. (2d) 60.
2 State ex rel. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Becker (1931) 328 Mo. 541, 41
S. W. (2d) 188; State ex rel. Clinton Falls Nursery Co. v. Steel County
Board of County Commissioners (1930) 181 Minn. 427, 232 N. W. 737; Levitt
v. Attorney-General (1930) 111 Conn. 634, 151 Atl. 171; State ex rel. Wiles
v. Williams (1910) 232 Mo. 56, 133 S. W. 1; State ex rel. N. A. R. Co. v. John-
ston (1911) 234 Mo. 338, 137 S. W. 595; State v. Sedillo (1929) 34 N. M. 1,
275 Pac. 765; State ex rel. Lockwood v. Tyler (1922) 64 Mont. 124, 208 Pac.
108; Estus v. State (1921) 83 Okla. 181, 200 Pac. 1002; Mohall Farmers'
Elevator Co. v. Hall (1920) 44 N. D. 430, 176 N. W. 131; Attorney-General
v. Taubenheim (1917) 178 App. Div. 321, 164 N. Y. S. 904; Ridgell v. Hall(1915) 99 Nebr. 89, 155 N. W. 228, 156 N. W. 16; People ex 'rel. Cruce v.
Cease (1911) 28 Okla. 271, 114 Pac. 251; Capito v. Topping (1909) 65 W. Va.
587, 64 S. E. 849; Foshe v. Burley (1908) 80 S. C. 127, 61 S. E. 255; Clark v.
Miller (1874) 54 N. Y. 528.
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a statute may be questioned only by those whose private rights
are affected. 3
Other cogent, but less frequently advanced reasons, include the
following: Respect for the integrity and ability of the legislature
should cause judicial reluctance to declare a statute unconstitu-
tional unless absolutely necessary to the decision in a case.4 Effi-
cient administration demands that statutes be not questioned by
ministerial officers. 5 An administrative official cannot assume
a judicial function.8 A petty ministerial officer of the State can-
not be allowed to ignore a legislative mandate which he deems
invalid.7 Obedience to its laws is absolutely essential in a well-
regulated government. 8
The significance of all these objections is illustrated practically
by the subject-matter involved in the following typical situations
which usually arise: where an official attempts to resist a tax
which he is required by statute to collect. (Here the courts
have almost without exception refused to permit a public officer
to defend a mandamus suit on the ground that the law under
which the tax is levied is unconstitutional, for the apparent reason
that so to do would interfere with the efficient operation of the
government) ;9 where the duty is merely a manual or physical
one; 10 where the direction is to create a minor or inferior public
J. & T. Cousins Co. v. Shoe and Leather Workers' Industrial Union (1934)
268 N. Y. S. 547; Conway v. Lane Cotton Mills Co. (L. A. 1934) 152 So. 312;
Clark v. State (Miss. 1934) 152 So. 820. The rule applies to all legal pro-
ceedings. 12 Corpus Juris 760-1: "It is a firmly established principle of
law that the constitutionality of a statute may not be attacked by one whose
rights are not affected by the operation of the statute. This rule applies to
all cases both at law and in equity, and is equally applicable in both civil and
criminal proceedings. . . . In other words, one attacking the constitution-
ality of a statute must show that it affects him injuriously and actually de-
prives him of a constitutional right."
4 State v. Seebold (1905) 192 Mo. 1. c. 731, 91 S. W. 491.
5 State ex rel. Wiles v. Williams, supra, note 2, 1. c. 190: "Since such an
officer has no personal interest involved, to tolerate his objections to the va-
lidity of the law would lead to delays and endless confusion in the admin-
istration of the law." Also note 2, supra.
6 State ex rel. N. A. R. Co. v. Johnston, supra, note 2.
7 Threadgill v. Cross (1910) 26 Okla. 403, 109 Pac. 558, 138 Am. St. Rep.
964.
8 State ex rel. New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Heard (1895) 47 La.
Ann. 1679, 18 So. 746 1. c. 752.
9 Wright v. Kelly (1894) 41 Idaho 624, 43 Pac. 565; Bassett v. Barbin
(1856) 11 La. Ann. 672; People ex rel. Attorney-General v. Saloman (1870)
54 Ill. 39.
10 State ex rel. Chicago R. Is. and P. Ry. Co. v. Becker, supra, note 2 (issu-
ance of a statutory corporation license) ; Franklin County v. State (1888)
24 Fla. 55, 12 Am. St. Rep. 183, 3 So. 471 (requiring county commissioners
to receive and keep election returns) ; Commonwealth v. James (1890) 135
Pa. 480, 19 Atl. 950, (compelling county clerk to file and record certain reso-
lutions of a school board) ; State ex rel. Cruce v. Cease, supra, note 2, (com-
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office;" where a subordinate officer, in carrying out the orders of
his superior, wishes to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute under which his superior acts.12
II
A few jurisdictions go to the extreme of holding that public
officials may at any time raise the question of the constitutionality
of a statute in a mandamus suit against them.13 The recent case
of City of Montpelier iv. Gates et al. (1934) propounds this
minority view as one ground for its decision. The Vermont
tax act of 1931 changed radically the State's tax scheme, to the
detriment, particularly, of the towns of the State. To compen-
sate for this the statute provided for various reimbursements by
way of certificates to be issued by the tax commissioner. Cer-
tificates were issued, but the State fiscal officers refused to pay.
Mandamus was brought, the defense being that the tax law was
unconstitutional. The Court held that the officers were suffi-
ciently interested to enable them to raise the question of validity
because an unconstitutional law is no law at all.' 4
It would seem that this minority rule might disturb too fre-
quently the governmental processes. In view of the multifarious
objections to such a judicial holding,"; the court in the Gates
case should have avoided such unequivocal support of the
pelling county officers of new county to hold their offices at a county seat
designated by the governor in pursuance of a statute) ; Threadgill v. Cross,
supra, note 7, (requiring the Secretary of State to file an initiative petition).
11 State ex rel. Nicholls v. Shakespeare (1889) 41 La. Ann. 156, 6 So. 592(to compel the mayor to create a police board); U. S. ex rel. Schumacher v.
Marble (1883) 3 Mackey (D. C.) 32, (registry of trade marks and patents).
12 People ex rel. State Board of Equalization v. Pitcher (1916) 61 Colo.
149, 156 Pac. 812; Utah v. Candland, supra, note 13; Woodall v. Darst (1912)
71 W. Va. 350, 77 S. E. 264. Nor.can an interpretation of law by the superior
officer be challenged by a subordinate. State ex rel. Miller v. Buchanan
(1884) 24 W. Va. 362.
33 City of Montpelier v. Gates et al. (1934), supra, note 1; Van Horn v.
State ex rel. Abbot (1895) 46 Nebr. 62, 83; 64 N. W. 365, 372; Utah v. Cand-
land (1909) 36 Utah 406, 104 Pac. 285; Brandenstein v. Hoke (1894) 101 Cal.
131, 35 Pac. 526; McCurdy v. Tappan (1872) 29 Wis. 664, 9 Am. Rep. 622;
Norman v. Kentucky Bd. of Examiners (1892) 93 Ky.'537, 20 S. W. 901;
Tombs v. Sharkey (1925) 40 Miss. 676, 106 So. 273. In Utah v. Candland,
supra, the court said: "No other conclusion is permissible if the Constitution
is the supreme law, and if legislative acts in conflict therewith are not merely
voidable but are absolutely void. A legislative act which is in conflict with
the Constitution is still born and of no force or effect-impotent alike to con-
fer rights or to afford protection." 104 Pac. 1. c. 290.14Supra, note 12, 1. c. 476: "This must be so if, as we are taught, an un-
constitutional statute is a mere nullity that confers no rights, imposes no
duties, and affords no protection."
15 See supra, notes 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
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minority, and based its decision upon the more satisfactory
ground that since public funds were involved, public interest re-
quired that the officer be allowed to defend the action.16 A too
liberal tendency away from the principle allowing only an inter-
ested party to question the constitutionality of a law may open
the judicial door to constant abuse by public officers, both of the
legislature and its enactments and of the judicial process itself.
III
The general rule on authority provides a more fundamentally
sound approach to the difficulty involved. Manifestly, strict
compliance with the rule by the courts would result in many cases
in inconvenience and injustice. For these reasons the Courts
have supplied flexibility in the general principle by attaching cer-
tain exceptions to its operation, all of them generally recognized.
Two Missouri cases, State ex rel. Equality Building Association
v. Brown, and State ex rel. Webster Groves Loan and Building
Association v. Brown, both decided at the present spring term of
court, adopt the view that the general rule will cease to operate
when the attorney-general of the State advises a public officer
that the statute passed by the Legislature is unconstitutional.17
The basis for this exception, which has gained a prevalent recog-
nition, is suggested in State ex rel. Wiles v. Williams,18 Judge
Woodson indicating that the attorney-general and his assistants
must as a duty give legal advice to other officers of the State when
called upon for an opinion regarding the administration of the
affairs of their respective offices.' 9 Apparently the Courts are
willing to concede that the legal opinions of the attorney-general
should be sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that
the statute is constitutional.
A second exception arises where to enforce the request of the
relator for a mandamus would result in a violation of the re-
See infra, note 25.
17 Supra, note 1. In the Equality Building Association case, the associa-
tion applied to the Secretary of State for an extension by statutory method
(Laws of Missouri, 1931, p. 158) of its corporate charter. The Secretary
refused to issue the extension until relator paid a fee based upon its capital
stock, contending that the statute was unconstitutional, and further, that
he had obtained an opinion from the attorney-general so advising. Held:
"Respondent's return apparently brings him within the well-recognized ex-
ception that even such an officer can justify his refusal to perform when ad-
vised by the attorney-general of the State that the statute is unconstitu-
tional." 1. c. 58. See also: State ex rel. Wiles v. Williams, supra, note 1;
State ex rel. v. Becker, supra, note 1; Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney-Gen-
eral v. Mathues (1904) 210 Pa. 372, 59 Atl. 961.
R Supra, note 1.
19 Ibid., 133 S. W. 1. c. 6.
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spondent's oath of office.20 However, as declared in State ex rel.
Railroad v. State Board of Equalizers, the Courts which adhere
to this exception tolerate a fallacy for the reason that every act
of the legislature is "presumptively constitutional until judicially
declared otherwise, and that the oath of office 'to obey the Con-
stitution' means to obey the Constitution not as the officer de-
cides, but as judicially determined. ' 21 The better policy would
require something more than the mere violation of the oath of
office before the officer involved may be permitted to invoke a
plea of unconstitutionality of a legislative enactment.
Although the situation has seldom come into issue, where the
relator seeks mandamus to compel a public officer to disregard a
subsequent statute as unconstitutional, and act under a previous
one, the public officer may properly raise the question regarding
the constitutionality of the previous enactment.22 Not to do so
might result in the declaration by the Court that only the subse-
quent statute is unconstitutional while the same or similar ob-
jections could be raised by the respondent against the validity of
the prior enactment.
The Courts have always maintained the right of a ministerial
officer to resist a mandamus action when the performance of his
duty under an unconstitutional statute would subject him to pen-
alties or personal liability.23 While universally named as an ex-
ception to the rule, here the interest of the administrator is not
merely official. Representative of this class of cases is State
ex rel. Pierce v. Stusher wherein a sheriff was allowed to ques-
tion the constitutionality of an income tax act because if the act
were unconstitutional, the sheriff "would not be protected by that
law in the event that he seized and sold the property of the al-
leged delinquent taxpayers." 24
But when the element of personal liability does not appear the
Courts must consider the right to question the statute as a de-
20 State ex rel. Miller v. Leech (1916) 33 N. D. 513, 157 N. W. 492; Nor-
man v. Ky. Ed. of Managers, supra, note 13; Rhea v. Newman (1913) 153
Ky. 604, 156 S. W. 154; State ex rel. Lockwood v. Tyler (1922) 64 Mont. 124,
208 Pac. 1081.
21 (1922) 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681 1. c. 683.22 People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson (1895) 155 Ill. 451, 40 N. E. 307.
The relator contended that the Illinois law of apportioning the state into
senatorial districts was unconstitutional, and that therefore the apportion-
ment must be according to the act of 1882. The county clerk interposed the
defense that the act of 1882 was unconstitutional. The Court held that both
acts may be subject to the same vice, and the just and reasonable solution
would be to allow the defense (1. c. 309).
23 State ex rel. Pierce v. Slusher (1926) 119 Or. 141, 248 Pac. 358; Attor-
ney-General v. Taubenheimer, supra, note 2; Capito v. Topping, supra, note
2; Norman v. Kentucky Ed. of Managers, supra, note 20; Utah v. Candland,
supra, note 13; Summer v. Beeler (1875) 50 Ind. 341.24 Supra, note 23, 1. c. 360.
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fense to mandamus from a standpoint of sound policy, as indi-
cated previously. This policy is most frequently exercised in
the most difficult exception to the general rule, namely, that
where the general public interest so requires, the Constitutional
point should be decided in the mandamus action.25 This broad
ground of exception might well have been the sole basis for the
decision in City of Montpelier v. Gates because the defendants in
that case were "in a very real sense, the custodians and conserva-
tors of the public funds, which they are forbidden to disburse ex-
cept as the Legislature appropriates them." 26 It would seem ad-
visable to allow a liberal construction in favor of the respondent
in any case where a substantial expenditure of public funds is in-
volved. This would also be true where a prompt ascertainment
of the constitutional status of a legislative enactment is desirable.
An excellent illustration of the advantage accruing when a public
officer is allowed to raise the constitutional issue in the latter case,
is the situation where school funds are authorized under a legis-
lative mandate to be diverted from the school fund, and the pub-
lic officer refuses so to divert.2 7 It would result adversely to the
community as a whole to refuse a prompt and final judicial decla-
ration as to the status of these school funds.
A few jurisdictions, however, refuse to recognize the "public
interest" exception.28 It is plausible to assume that in these juris-
dictions postponement of the final determination of the constitu-
tional issue may, and often will, result subsequently in great pub-
lic inconvenience and loss. 2 9
IV
With relation to the national Congress, a mooted point will
arise should an administrative official against whom mandamus
25 City of Montpelier v. Gates, supra, note 1; Coleman v. Hurst (Ky. 1928)
11 S. W. (2d) 133; State ex rel. Foreman v. Wheatley (1917) 113 Miss. 555,
74 So. 427; People ex rel. Colorado Tax Commission v. Pitcher (1914) 56
Colo. 343, 138 Pac. 509; Attorney-General v. Mathues (1904) 210 Pa. 372, 59
Atl. 961; School District v. Snyder (1923) 29 Wyo. 163, 212 Pac. 758; State
ex rel. Miller v. Ludz (1916) 33 N. D. 513, 157 N. W. 492; Woodall v. Darst
(1912) 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S. E. 264; Gilmer v. Holton (1881) 98 N. C. 26, 3
S. E. 812; Stockman v. Leddy (1912) 55 Colo. 24, 129 Pac. 220.
26 Supra, note 1, 1. c. 476.
27 State ex rel. School District v. Snyder, supra, note 25. The legislature
attempted to authorize a diversion of the rents and profits from certain oil
lands from the permanent school fund. Respondent was allowed to ques-
tion the constitutionality of the enactment.
28 State ex rel. New Orleans Canal and Banking Co. v. Heard, supra, note
2; Suit by relator on certain bonds. Respondent contended that the bonds
were null and void. Approximately $10,000 was involved. The defense of
unconstitutionality was held unavailable.
29 Such would have been the consequence in the Snyder case, supra, note 27,
had not the court considered the validity of the statute.
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is brought attempt to test the validity of an enactment by the
legislature under its spending power. Apparently, the only re-
strictions upon this power have been that the money be appro-
priated for the general welfare and for a national purpose.30
The decision as to what is "general welfare" or a "national pur-
pose" seems to lie with Congress alone. 31 If that body acts un-
wisely, responsibility is to its constituency-not to the Courts.
If this is the judicial attitude then it is not conceivable that man-
damus will lie.
Some doubt is cast upon this accepted concept by two federal
decisions. In an early District of Columbia Appeals case, man-
damus was brought against a disbursing officer of the Federal
government to compel him to pay certain sugar bounties provided
for under a Congressional Act. The officer raised the question of
constitutionality of the statute.3 2 The Court, without any con-
sideration of the right of the officer to use such a defense, de-
termined the constitutional issue, for it believed "the question one
that should be met and determined."
33
Whether the particular remedy of mandamus may be used has
never been directly decided by the federal Supreme Court. That
Court has stated, by way of dictum, that it might be possible to
raise the issue as to whether or not an appropriation by Congress
is national and for purposes of the general welfare.
3 4
The better policy would seem to favor the right of the public
officer, if mandamus is brought against him, to resist the issuance
of the writ upon the exceptional ground of "public interest."36
The element of stability given by a judicial decision would seem to
enhance rather than to detract from the Congressional power.
State cooperation would seem to be more secure.
V
The clear tendency in the cases where mandamus is brought
against the administrative official seems to be toward exactness in
applying both the rule and its exceptions. The courts have often
forgotten or overlooked the fact that the writ of mandamus is an
30 Corwin, E. S., "The Spending Power of Congress." (1923) 36 Harv.
L. Rev. 548, 1. c. 575-6.
31 Ibid., 1. c. 576. Modern writers confirm this view, p. 576, f. n. 75. Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon (1923) 262 U. S. 447, held that a taxpayer's interest is
too infinitesimal to allow him to oppose a Congressional Act, thus leaving
mandamus as a possible remedy.
32 U. S. ex rel. Miles Planting and Manufacturing Co. v. Carlisle (1894)
5 D. C. App. 138.
33 Ibid., 1. c. 146.34 United States v. Realty Co. (1896) 163 U. S. 427 1. c. 440.
35 Supra, note 25.
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extraordinary legal remedy. It need not be granted as a matter
of right; it is an unusual remedy, the application of which is
within the discretion of the court.36 It is, therefore, unneces-
sary as well as undesirable for judges to attempt to categorize the
factual situations which will or will not cause an issuance of the
writ. It would seem that the guiding factors should be public
interest and expediency, unimpeded by rigid rules of classifica-
tion. The precedents of the past should serve as useful guides,
but a careful investigation of the public convenience should be the
ultimate determining factor.
It is arguable that an extension of the use of declaratory judg-
ments and advisory opinions would be a more satisfactory solu-
tion to the problem. 31 By the requirement that courts hand down
their opinions as to the validity of statutes preparatory to their
execution, all questions of expediency, efficiency in government
and public interest become immaterial. The courts as a matter
of law would be compelled to determine the constitutional question
which may arise; and the extraordinary remedy of mandamus
against the public officer would no longer be necessary.
P. RASHBAUM, '34.
36 Ferriss, "Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies" (1926) pp. 230-1:
"Mandamus is not a writ of right. Its issuance unquestionably lies in the
sound judicial discretion of the court .... Before granting the writ the
court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which may be con-
cerned.... It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surround-
ing facts and circumstances."
37 Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power
to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further re-lief is or could be claimed .... The declaration may be either affirmative
or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree." Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act, 9 Unif. Laws Anno. 119. That this type of remedy will be expanded is
more than probable since the implied affirmation by the United States Su-
preme Court of the Tennessee Declaratory Judgments Act. Nashville Ry. v.
Wallace (1933) 288 U. S. 249.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss4/11
